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Abstract—We consider the non-linear properties
and boundaries in the three forms of sharing, gift,
and reselling economy. We decode the economic
rationality and marketplace mechanisms in today’s
ever booming sharing/gifting/reselling networks.
We contribute to the fundamental economics lit-
erature by decomposing a merchandise into two
parts: the ownership good and the detached good.
The ownership good can be utilized or shared
by the owner. The detached good can either be
given as a gift or be resold for an income. The
separation is bounded by considering the estimated
finite life of the good and a future time stamp
of detachment. We consider owner’s holding cost,
various transaction costs, rewards, as well as the
incentive mechanism from the network. We find
that there exist various conditions when certain
ownership form is more preferred to the others.
Our results also indicate that governmental and
marketplaces’ incentive policies play an important
role when consumers make decisions among the
three economic forms and consequently adjusting
the total social welfare.
Keywords: Gift Economy, Sharing Economy, Re-
sale Market, Incentive Policy
I. Introduction
Thanks to the fast development of information
technology, the Internet based social networks and
online marketplace, the economies of sharing, gifting,
and reselling have emerged as important elements
in our daily lives. The sharing economy refers to
the economic activities when goods or services are
arranged to be shared among a group of consumers,
characterized by a discounted . The Gift economy
refers to the economic activities that aim to transfer
goods or services freely to other individuals without
an agreed method of quid pro quo. The economy of
reselling represents the transfer of the remaining value
of goods accompanied by a resale price.
Before the end of life time stamp of a good or
service, the owner has the free choice to use, share,
give, or sell its remaining value. For examples, the
old clothes, the unused instruments, a used car, an
apartment, their value can be realized by various
economic forms. What affects an owner’s decision to
choose one form that makes the best economic sense?
There are several important elements that we must
consider: including the value of the goods, inventory
cost, transaction costs, policy incentives and available
marketplaces.
A costly inventory would normally give the owner
a strong incentive to detach the good’s ownership
by resale or gift-giving. On the contrary, a high re-
maining value of the good would make the owner
willing to keep the ownership for individual or group
consumption. In this research, we are motivated to
investigate the impact of these key elements on shar-
ing/gift/resale decisions and the balance/equilibrium
among these three forms in economics.
Today’s sharing economy is usually carried out on
a networked platform that allows people to share
goods and services. In recent years, many sharing mar-
ketplaces have emerged, targeting various economic
segments, for example AirBnB and Roomorama for
lodgement, SnapGoods for tools, RelayRides for cars,
Wheelz for bikes, Uber and Lyft for ad hoc taxi
services, etc. Services can also be shared, for example
peer-to-peer lending, crowdfunding, and couchsurfing,
coworking, knowledge and talent-sharing, etc. The
sharing economy is characterized by group consump-
tion, which means cheaper, extra income for the
owners, and a new social-networked communities. We
foresee that sharing economy will keep evolving and
become more flexibility and eminent in the near future
because of its fundamental economic drives.
To some extent, sharing sounds like rental which
is a classic form of economy because under both
circumstances, the owner of the good makes money
by transferring the right to use it without changing
4118
Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2017
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41658
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2
CC-BY-NC-ND
the ownership of the good. However, there are some
differences between sharing and rental. First of all,
sharing economy is more like a group behavior while
rental is an individual behavior. For example, the
users of Uber who do not know each other may take
one car to the same destination for saving the cost
and time, but renting a car usually means only the
lessee could use the car during the tenancy term no
matter how he uses it. Secondly, the owner could use
the good with others at the same time in sharing
economy while that would not happen in rental econ-
omy. For instance, the users of AirBnB might find
a room on the website which needs to live with the
owner of the house, but renting a house always means
renting the whole house and a formal lease contract
is provided. To summarize, sharing economy is more
flexible and convenient than rental while the rental
is more standard and traditional, so people choose
sharing or rental according to their different demands
and purposes.
Gift economy is a method for people to transfer
goods or services without any payoff of exchange.
Nowadays, applications based on the gift economy
principles varies widely. For example, we have the
charitable donation, collectivism, cooperativeness, do-
nation requested, pay as you will, pay it forward, and
proceeds of sale donated. The gift economy represents
an optimistic attitudes of people and it’s like a way to
transfer the goods or services form relative abundance
to relative scarcity. What’s more, it’s motivated by
people’s compassion, generosity and favor the common
good over individual advantages. However, another
important perspective forces us to review and reflect
on how we think about and measure value. This
awareness can be transferred into normal market
transactions as well, taking the indirect costs like
inventory costs and profits of specific acts of material
consumption into consideration.
Resale marketplace is another option that the owner
can seek in order to transfer the ownership of the
goods/services. Because of the lack of pricing struc-
ture of un-uniform resale market, auction is often used
in order to retrieve the genuine value of the goods in
demand, for example eBay. Fixed price or negotiation
are also common, for example Amazon marketplace.
The transaction cost can be very high and the value
can be underestimated due to the lack of standardized
pricing structure in the resale market.
The goods that are idle for one person may be
needed by others, so they can make a deal by sharing,
giving, or reselling. During the ownership period, we
make a simplified definition by considering individual
consumption as a special case of collective consump-
tion when only the owner utilizes the good/service. By
considering all the factors that influence the decision
making, with general rationality, the owner is more
willing to keep the ownership when the future income
and the value exceeds the costs of holding it. When the
holding cost is significantly high, the owner would be
more likely to transfer the ownership. There should
exists an equilibrium where the owner is indifferent
of sharing, giving, or reselling. The indifference point
is further adjustable by the sharing network, charity
organizations, the taxation policy, and by resale mar-
ketplace.
Among all the above mentioned factors, inventory
cost is one of the most significant one because it
accumulates over time. The rest of the factors/costs
are mostly static at a certain time point. By as-
suming a limited life of product, we thus are keen
to investigate the impact of the cost structure and
incentive mechanisms that are offered by the three
economic forms. Among the three, gift economy is
rarely studied because of lack of incentives. We argue
that besides the psychological causes to give gift, the
economic benefit is also a vital motivation for owners
to give goods for free. It could simply be the high
accumulative inventory cost or the strong taxation
incentive.
In this research, we aim to investigate the inter-
changeable relationships among the seemingly unre-
lated sharing, gift and resale economy. We contribute
to both the economics and IS literature by identifying
the most important drives of the three economic
forms, including the inventory holding cost, the trans-
action costs, the financial incentives, and the various
time stamps. Moreover, we base our analysis on two
variations of substitute modeling and consider the
properties of social welfare by incorporation the utility
functions of different players. As a result, we show
that both individual utility and total social welfare
are augment-able by fine-tuning the the incentives,
the transaction costs, and eventually the time of
ownership transfer of the goods. Our results bring
meaningful and interesting insights to today’s sharing,
gift, and resale platform companies on how to improve
the efficiency and competitiveness.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In section II, We provide a brief review of literature
in sharing economy, gift economy and resale market.
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In Section III we propose an economic model that is
able to describe and differentiate these three economic
forms. We discuss the results and draw managerial im-
plication in Section IV. We make concluding remarks
and give guidance to future research in Section V.
II. Literature Review
From the existing literature in sharing economy,
gift economy and resale market, we find a common
agreement that all forms of ownership must create real
consumer value at the end. The concept of sharing
bikes( Wheelz), cars(Uber), or houses(Airbnb) begins
to become more and more popular [5]. In order to
obtain the stable mobility, existing shared mobility
business models try hard to find the optimal relation-
ship between good owners and receivers. What’s more,
sharing economy now achieves success in the compe-
tition with concrete firms and makes itself differential
to acquire market share [14]. The economy of sharing
is often linked to the collaborative consumption [2].
In terms of how we think about ownership, collabo-
rative consumption is often considered as important
as the Industrial Revolution. Almost all industries are
involved in this ongoing disruptive change of sharing
economy and collaborative consumption. People can
use collaborative consumption as a force to effect the
sustainable development and a method to strengthen
communities [3]. On the top of that, owing to infor-
mation and communications technologies, collabora-
tive consumption develops rapidly [7]. And different
factors like sustainability play important roles in mo-
tivating the participation in CC.
However, its dark side need to be deal with when
the sharing economy grows up [8], which means to
gain unfair advantage like regulatory arbitrage should
be avoided. And democratizing the ownership and
governance of the platform would help to control the
power of new technologies [12]. In the other hand,
there are still fleet and inventory cost even in the
sharing economy[13]. New sharing economy market
like reengineered consumption models are needed.
Supposing if there is no inventory cost, the owner
of the goods/services would have the intention to keep
them with any residue value. If there exist a reward
to transfer the ownership as a gift or certain holding
cost, the tendency to keep the goods may withdraw.
It creates the economy of gifts. With non-zero inven-
tory cost, depreciating value of the good,and taxation
benefit, the owner might make a negative utility if
he/she holds the good. The gift economy, however, is
not always attractive [9], and it can push people away
and seek the valorized market as an alternative option.
What’s more, people pay little attention and hardly
show their understanding to gift giving [4], because of
the privacy and conceptual framework of this activity.
Resale market heavily depreciated machines pro-
duced in these dispute-affected equipment [10]. Be-
sides, components of these machines were resold more
frequently and received lower list prices. In standard
auctions, there is a bidder in resale market who
doesn’t have any use value for the good on sale [6].
When resale leads the auction, there is an equilib-
rium in the auction-plus-resale game, which would
determine the bidding price [1]. But in perfect resale
market, the auction with resale would not be the best
choice for the seller.
III. Substitution Model of Sharing, Giving,
& Reselling
Thanks to the fast development of the Internet, the
IoT technologies and the social networks, the barrier
of collaborative trade, consumption, and donation
become much smaller comparing to that in the recent
past. It creates new but significantly large business
communities of sharing, giving and reselling goods
and services. We are keen to firstly investigate the
relationship among these emerging economic forms
and secondly to probe their boundaries as well as
the optimal choices when the best social/individual
welfare is extracted.
We observe certain similarities among the three
forms by considering the time when the good’s owner-
ship is transferred. Individual and collaborative con-
sumption is characterized by holding the ownership.
Well, collaborative consumption does not strictly fol-
low the ownership if the consumer only “rent”. Because
the focus of this research is on the boundary of sharing
and gift, we emphasize on the good owner’s decision in
the following model development. Gift and resale are
similar because in both forms the ownership will be
transferred. Figure1 demonstrate how we can decom-
pose a good or service simply based on its expected
life and the time point of ownership transfer.
A good can be decomposed into two parts by
specifying the separation point when the ownership is
transferred on the time line, which ranges from time
zero to its end of life (Figure 1). Let T represent the
end of life time stamp of a good. We decompose the
good/service in two parts: the ownership part (Ps)
and the detachment part (Pg or Pr). Pg represents
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P s P g
P r0 Tt
P= P s +P g
P= P s +P r
Fig. 1. Decomposition of a good
the remaining part to be given as a gift and Pr
indicates that the remaining value will be resold on
a reselling market. Whenever the good still belongs to
the owner, he/she has to choose whether to separate
the ownership in the future, when (t), and how (gift
or resale).
We need to compare the utility of sharing and giving
and reselling. Because of the difference in ownership
and accumulative effect of time, sharing needs consid-
ering more concerns than giving rather than making
the decision only according to the value at a certain
time. Furthermore, if the owner decides to give up
the ownership, the choice between the giving and
reselling depends on the payoff of the two choices. To
be specific, the value of reward, the price of reselling
and transaction costs are the key factors to affect the
payoffs.
A. The Incentive & Cost Structure
The gift economy is different from a free supply-
demand market because the goods are not well orga-
nized, listed and marketed to the consumers. It in-
volves transaction costs for both donors and receivers
to give and find the right goods. In this sense, the
intermediary plays a very important role in reducing
the transaction costs from both side by giving effort
to improve the service.
We consider the intrinsic value of goods, inventory
holding cost, transaction cost, and good-will rewards
in the gift economy model.
We use the following list of notations:
• V : value of the good
• HC: holding cost of the good
• R(v): Good-will reward of giving a gift
• S: Income from sharing
• TC1: Transaction cost of sharing
• TC2: Transaction cost of gift
• TC3: Transaction cost of resale
• T : estimated remaining life of the good from time
zero
• Re(v): Resale price
• i: time interest/discount rate
• Ur: Utility from resale
• Ug: Utility from gift giving
• U1: Utility from owning the good
• U2: Utility from detaching the good
At any time point of a good before its end of life,
the owner has three choices: 1) to give the good as a
gift, or 2) to share(use) it, 3) to resell it. The utility
of sharing/using the good is the value of the good (V )
plus the income from sharing/using it (S) minus the
holding/maintenance cost (HC) and the transaction
cost (TC1)as represented in (1). The utility of gift
giving consists of the inventory holding credit (HC)
plus the reward (R) minus the value of the good
(V ) and the transaction cost(TC2), equation (2). The
utility of reselling the good is price of the good
according to the value of the good (V ) minus the
holding/maintenance cost (HC) and the transaction
cost(TC3) as represented in (4)
U1 = V (t)−HC(t)− TC1 + S(t) (1)
U2(t) = Max{Ug, Ur}t (2)
Ug = HC(t)− V (t)− TC2 +R (3)
Ur = Re(V (t)) +HC(t)− V (t)− TC3 (4)
Equation (1) to (4) depict the economical rational-
ity behind sharing/gift/resale decision in general. We
can further define the product valuation, the holding
cost, and the sharing income according to time as
follows:
V (t) = A( e
k
1 + i)
t (5)
HC(t) = Cln(1 + i) [1− (1 + i)
−t] (6)
S(t) = s · t (7)
In equation (5), k is the a kind of value power which
shows the change of value. value decreases with the
time when k < 0 while value increases when k > 0.
In the (6), we assume unit holding cost is a constant,
maintenance cost. In the (7), we assume unit sharing
income is a constant like monthly or weekly rental
income. Equation (5) to (7) are still very general,
and can be fine-tuned according to commodity types
in different industries or applications. We use these
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equations to facilitate the calculations and to demon-
strate the boundaries and conditions in the different
economic forms.
Theorem 1. At any time point if α = Re(V (t)) −
TC3 +TC2−R > 0, resale is more preferable than gift
giving. Otherwise, the good owner would rather like to
make a donation.
Proof. It can be easily proved by comparing Ur with
Ug where α stands for the difference between these
two possible owner’s utilities.
From now on we use U2 to represent the utility of
detaching the good, where U2(t) = Max{Ug, Ur}t. If
we consider U1 and U2 as two substitute choices for
the owner, which means if U1 surpasses U2, the owner
intends to share. Otherwise, if U2 is greater than U1,
he/she prefer to detaching the good either as a gift or
as a resale item. His/Her maximization problem for
perfect complements can be modeled as follow:
MaxU{x, y}t (8)
subject to:
xtU1 + ytU2 = U{x, y}t (9)
xt + yt = 1 (10)
xt ∈ {0, 1} (11)
yt ∈ {0, 1} (12)
From equations (5) to (7), We can form the fol-
lowing intermediate formulas regarding the remaining
value of the good, the inventory cost/credit, and the
sharing income.
V (t)′ = A( e
k
1 + i)
t[k − ln(1 + i)] (13)
V (t)′′ = A( e
k
1 + i)
t[k − ln(1 + i)]2 (14)
HC(t)′ = C(1 + i)−t (15)
HC(t)′′ = −C ln(1 + i)(1 + i)−t (16)
S′ = s (17)
S′′ = 0 (18)
and draw the graph of U1 and U2 respectively in the
same coordinate system in order to determine whether
x = 1 or y = 1. alternatively, we can also observe the
function U1 − U2 directly to find the even point.
To be detailed:
U1(t)′ = V ′ −HC ′ + S′ (19)
U1(t)′′ = V ′′ −HC ′′ + S′′ (20)
U1(0) = A− TC1 (21)
U2(t)′ = HC ′ − V ′ (22)
U2(t)′′ = HC ′′ − V ′′ (23)
U2(0) = −A+R− TC2 (24)
Theorem 2. If k > ln(1+i), the owner would be more
likely to prefer to sharing/holding the good than giving
it out as a gift.
Proof. Because the value of the good always increases,
the owner would consider keeping the ownership of the
good as appreciation instead of depreciation.
So we will discuss under the circumstance k <
ln(1 + i), which makes V ′ − HC ′ = A[k − ln(1 +
i)]( ek1+i)
t − C(1 + i)−t lower than zero in that case.
What’s more, it’s obvious to get that U2(t)′ > 0 and
U2(t)′′ < 0 while U1(t)′′ > 0. And there are two
situations for the sign of U1(t)′. However, U1(∞)′ =
S′ > 0 shows that no matter whether the initial value
U1(t)′ is positive or negative, U1(t)′ would become
positive eventually. So we could draw different graphs
for different U1(0)′. Last but not least, it’s worthy to
compare U1(0) and U2(0). The specific situations will
be demonstrated in the following theorems.
Theorem 3. if U1(0) > U2(0) and U1(0)′ > 0, then
U1(t) always exceeds U2(t), which means the owner will
share the good until the end of product life cycle.
T0
U2(0)
U1(0)
t
U1(t)>U2(t)
Fig. 2. A1
Proof. Because U1(0)′ > 0, U1(t)′′ > 0, U1(t)′ > 0,
which indicates U1(t) monotonously increases. At the
same time, U2(t) monotonously increases. From the
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perspective of [U1 − U2](t), we can get [U1 − U2](t) >
0, [U1 − U2](0)′ > 0, [U1 − U2](t)′′ > 0 given those
conditions, which result in [U1 − U2](t) > 0 is correct
for all the t. In other words, U1(t) > U2(t) is always
correct.
Let t0 satisfies that U1(t0)′ = 0, and t? is the first
point which satisfies U1(t?) = U2(t?) then:
Theorem 4. If U1(0) > U2(0), U1(0)′ < 0 and t0 > T ,
then the separation point of sharing and giving is t?,
which means the owner will share the good until t? and
after t?, the owner will choose to give it as a gift.
T0
U2(0)
U1(0)
t
U1(t)>U2(t)
Separation Point
Fig. 3. A2
Proof. Because U1(t)′′ > 0 and U1(0)′ < 0, it’s
obvious to assure there exists a zero point t0 of
U1(t)′. And then, we can say that U1(t) decreases in
[0, t0] and increases in [t0,∞). In this case, t0 > T
indicates U1(t) monotonously decreases. In the other
hand, U2(t) monotonously increases. As the result of
U1(0) > U2(0), if U1(T ) < U2(T ), then there must be
a intersection t?, otherwise U1(t) > U2(t) is always
true like former case.
Theorem 5. If U1(0) > U2(0), U1(0)′ < 0 and t0 < T ,
then t? is the potential separation point, which means
the owner will give the good away at the time t? indeed
if the grey area is larger than the second red area,
otherwise the owner will share it until the T .
Proof. Because of the same analysis as former case
and t0 < T , U1(t) decreases in [0, t0] and increases in
[t0,∞). As the result of U1(0) > U2(0), if U1(t0) <
U2(t0), then there are two intersections for us to
consider, otherwise U1(t) > U2(t). To be detailed, t? is
sure to be achieved and it’s more important than the
second one because t? is potential giving point while
T0
U2(0)
U1(0)
Possible Separation Point
t1 t2
Fig. 4. A3
the second one is not. We just need it to determine
whether to give the good at the time t? by comparing
the red area after the second intersection and the grey
area before it. So actually, we don’t care its existence
and value.
Theorem 6. If U1(0) < U2(0) and U1(0)′ > 0, then
t? is the potential separation point, which means the
owner will give the good away at the time t? indeed if
the grey area is larger than the red area, otherwise the
owner will share it until the T .
T0
U2(0)
U1(0)
Possible Separation Point
t
Fig. 5. B1
Proof. Because U1(0)′ > 0, U1(t)′′ > 0, U1(t)′ >
0, which indicates U1(t) monotonously increases. At
the same time, U2(t) also monotonously increases.
However, U1(0) < U2(0). So we need to discuss the
function [U1 − U2](t). From the conditions, we get
that [U1 − U2](0) < 0, [U1 − U2](t)′ > 0, which shows
[U1 − U2](t) increases monotonously from a negative
initial value. And the existence of t? turns to be
nature.
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Theorem 7. If U1(0) < U2(0) and U1(0)′ < 0 then
U2(t) always exceeds U1(t), which means the owner will
give the good as a gift at the beginning.
T0
U2(0)
U1(0)
t
U2(t)>U1(t)
Fig. 6. Complete Gift Giving
Proof. In this case, U1(t) decreases in [0, t0] and in-
creases in [t0,∞) because of the condition U1(0)′ < 0,
while the U2(t) monotonously increase. What’s more,
U1(0) < U2(0) shows that before t0, U1(t) < U2(t) is
always true. However, we can’t deny there will be a
t? making U1(t?) = U2(t?), but in most cases t? would
exceed T .
For the purpose of observing the process more
clearly, we could consider the function [U1 − U2](t) =
2(V − HC) + S(t) − TC1 − R + TC2, which has the
similar trend with U1(t). As for the inflection point for
people from sharing to giving, the condition U1(t?) =
U2(t?) is equivalent to the condition [U1−U2](t?) = 0.
From the graph of U1 − U2, we can see when [U1 −
U2](0) > 0, if the minimum of the function is lower
than 0, it will exist t?, otherwise U1 − U2 is always
higher than 0. To conclude, let t1 satisfies that [U1 −
U2](t1)′ = 0, then only when [U1 − U2](t1) < 0, a t?
could be found. And it also can be observed from the
graph that higher the value of [U1−U2](t1), higher the
value of t?. However, when [U1−U2](0) < 0, potential
t? must exist but we need to determine whether to
give the good at the beginning.
Theorem 8. let [U1 − U2](t) = 2[V (t) − HC(t)] +
S(t)−TC1+TC2−R, given that t1 satisfies 2[V (t0)′−
HC(t0)′] + S′ = 0, then the increase in [U1 − U2](t1)
would cause the increase in t? and vice verso.
Proof. As mentioned above, the initial value of [U1 −
U2](t) is positive,and [U1 − U2](t) monotonously de-
creases when t increases to t1. As the result of that,
less the value of [U1−U2](t1), less the value of t?.
B. An Alternative Model
Because it’s possible for the owner to share the good
for a certain time period and give it as a gift in the
future, we may consider x and y as the tendency of
sharing and gift-giving respectively. In this case, we
shall abandon constraints (9)(10)(11) and make x and
y continuous. In other words, we will take the two
different statuses of a certain good, which are sharing
and giving, as two competitors in order to find the
result of the battle between sharing and giving.
If we consider the total remaining life of the good
as T and when the owner gives it as a gift in a future
time point t, x represents the proportion of sharing
as x = tT , and y represents the proportion of gift-
giving y = 1−x. The original problem from (3) to (7)
becomes:
MaxU{x, y} (25)
subject to:
xU1(t) + yU2(t) = U{x, y} (26)
x+ y = 1 (27)
x = t
T
, x ∈ [0, 1] (28)
y = 1− t
T
, y ∈ [0, 1] (29)
t ≤ T (30)
U1(t) = V (t)−HC(t) + S(t)− TC1 (31)
U2(t) = Max{Ug, Ur}t (32)
(5) states the intrinsic value of the good at a future
time t from time point 0. In order to calculate Vj , we
take into consideration of depreciation that consists
of the initial value of the asset and its estimated
“life”. (6) represents the accumulated value of released
inventory cost as an “inventory holding credit”.
where
V (t) = A( e
k
1 + i)
t (33)
HC(t) = Cln(1 + i) [1− (1 + i)
−t] (34)
V (t)′ = A( e
k
1 + i)
t[k − ln(1 + i)] (35)
HC(t)′ = C(1 + i)−t (36)
From the perspective of (27), MRS = −1, while
from the perspective of the linear utility function
(26), MUxMUy = −U2U1 . As the result of principles in the
microeconomics, MRS = MUxMUy indicates U1(t) = U2(t)
is the condition for the optimal solution, which is the
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same condition with what we discuss in the previous
part.
What’s more, for the purpose of maximizing the
utility, we need to find the point t?which makes
∂U
∂t (t
?) = 0. We can simplify that ∂U∂t =
1
T [U1 − U2] +
t
T [U
′
1 − U ′2] + U ′2. And it’s easy to prove the solution
of that equation is exactly t?.
IV. Economic & Managerial Implications
In general as been observed from Figure 2, Ps and
Pg is separable by t?, which could be affected by the
gift rewards R and sharing income S. The reward
usually has something to do with tax deduction, while
sharing income usually directly relates to cost and
sharing platform.
TABLE I
Analysis of Decision Points of Various Situations
PAR th2 th3 th3 th th5 th6 th7 th7
A 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
i 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
k 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
C 0.1 0.1 1 1 1 0.1 1 1
s 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.2
R 5 5 5 5 9 16 16 16
TC1 1 1 1 1 1 6 6 6
TC2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
T 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
U1(0) 9 9 9 9 9 4 4 4
U2(0) -7 -7 -7 -7 -3 5 5 5
∂U1(0) 0.45 0.35 -0.55 -0.95 -0.75 0.35 -0.55 0.15
t0 NA NA 8.4 30 14.5 NA 15.6 5.8
t∗ NA NA NA 15 12.2 4.3 53.6 15.8
The impact from the sharing income is that if only
S′ increases, then t1 decreases, [U1−U2](t1) decreases
and t? increases finally, even making giving not to
happen as shown in the tabel II.
TABLE II
Analysis of Decision Points of Various S′
PAR th2 th3 th3 th th5 th6 th7 th7
A 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
i 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
k 0.99 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
R 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
TC1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
TC2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
T 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
U1(0) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
U2(0) -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -11
∂U1(0) -0.95 -0.85 -0.75 -0.65 -0.55 -0.45 -0.35 -0.25
t0 30 20 11.4 11 8.4 6.3 4.5 3.0
t∗ 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.4 5.0 6.1
The impact from gift reward can be found by exam-
ining R. We can write R as λV (t) + R0. As a result,
there is an adjustment from 2 to 2−λ in the coefficient
of the V (t) and an added constant in the function
of U1 − U2. However, this adjustment only creates
small changes. If only R increase, then t1 decreases
, [U1 − U2](t1) decreases and t? decreases finally.
And vice versa. The change in TC1 and TC2 also
influences the value of t? via changing the minimum
of the function [U1 − U2](t). The integrated effect of
R + TC1 − TC2 can be shown in the table III.
TABLE III
Analysis of Decision Points of Various R+ TC1 − TC2
PAR th2 th3 th3 th th5 th6 th7 th7
A 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
i 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
k 0.99 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
R 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 6
TC1 1 2 3 4 1 1 1 1
TC2 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 2
T 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
U1(0) 9 8 7 6 9 9 9 9
U2(0) -7 -7 -7 -7 -6 -8 -8 -6
∂U1(0) -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95
t0 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
t∗ 15 13.1 11.5 10.1 13.1 17.4 17.4 13.1
From above analysis, we can conclude that:
Theorem 9. The decrease in S′ has the same effect
with the increase in R+TC1−TC2, which would both
cause the decrease in t?. Furthermore, inverse change
in R+TC1−TC2 and S′ would strengthen their effect
while synchronized change in R + TC1 − TC2 and S′
would counteract their respective effects.
From the perspective of the owner of the good, the
higher S′ would bring higher income but the high
income would discourage the owner to give the good
as a gift according to our results. However, the high
S′ would also make the good less competitive at the
same time. As the result of that, there is a equilibrium
in the price setting for the sharer to obtain the maxi-
mum income and meanwhile it wouldn’t eliminate the
possibility for the gift giving.
From the perspective of government, to increase
the reward by enhance the tax deduction is a good
method to encourage people to give the good away as
soon as possible. But it’s impossible to promote the
tax deduction without limiting cap, which is the most
common current practice. As it can be seen from our
results, the game between the sharing income and gift
economy reward would play a key role in the owner’s
decision. Adjusting the tax deduction corresponding
to the price of sharing market would make the reward
more effective.
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From the perspective of firms that promote gift
economy, normally these firms are considered non-
profit. There exist many challenges that they have to
overcome, such as the lack of supply, the increasing
demand of charity, the lack of understanding of both
donors and receivers, and sometimes the financial
difficulties to operate the platform and to reduce the
transaction cost. Our result shows that by reducing
the transaction cost, the time for people to give the
good as gift would be brought forward, which means
the platform would receive the goods earlier. Even
for those who will not donate the goods, the reduced
transaction cost and increased rewards would give
them the motivation to donate. Our results also shows
that today’s ever booming sharing and resale economy,
because of the reduced transaction cost to share and to
resell along with increasing sharing and resale income
thanks to the Internet, actually shrink the already
small market size for the the gift economy. We prove
that in order to boost the spirit of good-will in our
society, the government and the charity organizations
must come up with new models or effective taxation
incentives to struggle with the increasing income of
sharing or reselling in order to encourage the gift
giving, like revising the tax deduction corresponding
to the price of sharing market.
From the perspective of the sharing or reselling
platform, reducing the transaction cost by new tech-
nology would help them receive more goods from the
owner. And the goodwill for their efficiency like well
distribution of the goods would attract more people
to share or give their goods because they may believe
that platform could help them fulfill their purpose. In
that way, owing to the double-sided model, platform
would benefit from the increasing sharer/donors by at-
tracting more receivers, which would in turn promote
the goodwill of platform. Nevertheless, transaction
cost is the profit of platform, which means the transac-
tion cost would not decease without limit. Compared
with that in gift economy, our results shows that the
difference between two kinds of transaction cost could
be utilized by government or charity organizations to
encourage people to give their good as a gift.
V. Limitations & Future Research
In the paper, we assume that the sharing income is
a linear function of time, which is the simplest form
of income. However, the expression of sharing income
actually is more complicated and probability problem
should be taken into consideration because of the
uncertainty in sharing market. As the result of that,
we will consider combining other income function with
the probability theory in order to get more accurate
results in our future research. Moreover, reward of
giving a gift could also become a variable instead of a
constant, which would be an unprecedented work, so
different models for reward would also be focused on
in our future research. We expect that there exists a
optimal model for reward and in that case, we could
give a effective suggestion to the government and we
hope our efforts could make sense in the future.
VI. Conclusion
We consider the non-linear properties and bound-
aries in the three forms of sharing, gift, and resale
economy. We decode the economic rationality and
marketplace mechanisms in today’s ever booming
sharing/gifting/reselling networks. We contribute to
the fundamental economics literature by decomposing
a good into two parts: the ownership good and the
detached good. The ownership good can be utilized
or shared by the owner. The detached good can either
be given as a gift or be resold for an income. The
separation is bounded by considering the estimated
finite life of the good and a future time stamp of
detachment. We consider owner’s holding cost, various
transaction costs, rewards, as well as the incentive
mechanism from the network. We find that there
exist various conditions when certain ownership form
is more preferred to the others. Our results also
indicate that governmental and marketplaces’ incen-
tive policies play an important role when consumers
make decisions among the three economic forms and
consequently adjusting the total social welfare. To be
more specific, we model both individual utility and the
social welfare by considering sharing, gift, and resale
to be substitutes. We show that the total social welfare
can be increased by fine-tuning the incentives and the
various adjustable transaction costs.
Thanks to the rapid development of various online
social networks and recommender systems, today’s
consumers are able to gain access to information in-
stantly, to communicate with another consumer conve-
niently, and to cut the cost of most c2c transactions by
a great extent. The Internet has enabled the booming
of the three emerging economic forms that we have
discussed in this research. For future research, we
foresee lots of variations and new economic modeling
based on the research that we have presented in this
research. For an instance, in reality the parameter of
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k ≤ ln(1 + i) in our model happens to appear more
frequently than the ones when k > ln(1+ i). However,
the existing reward function loses its influence in the
case of k ≤ ln(1 + i), which means an alternative
reward mechanism should be designed.
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